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The evidence from selected Asian countries shows that: 
•  Microfinance on the whole has weathered the crisis well. The strongest of the 
microfinance systems in the region, the BRI unit system in Indonesia, has emerged from 
the crisis even stronger than before, characterized by a surge in savings deposits and 
continued excellent repayment performance. 
•  Demand for microcredit has not increased; there are some cases, as in the BRI units, 
where it has declined; in other cases, as among some Grameen replicators in the 
Philippines, neither the demand for, nor the supply of, microcredit seem to be affected. 
 
The resilience of microfinance in crisis situations, just as in normal times, appears to be most 
strongly influenced by three major factors: 
•  the institutional autonomy and self-reliance of MFIs in terms of internal resource 
mobilization and operational terms and conditions 
•  negatively by financial repression, comprising interest rate regulation, a lack of legal 
forms for MFIs, and a preponderance of subsidized targeted program credit which in one 
form or the other has persisted in every country 
•  positively by the deregulation of interest rates, institutional liberalization and the 
provision of appropriate legal forms for MFIs, accompanied by prudential regulation and 
effective supervision (the lack of which was a major factor in the downfall of the banking 
sector in the affected Asian countries). 
 
Governments tend to respond to the crisis by a return to past repressive practices, particularly 
subsidized targeted credit channeling, which will keep MFIs from evolving into healthy 
institutions which grow dynamically on the strength of their own resources. Instead, 
governments should concentrate on providing a fully adequate policy and legal environment 
and focus on assistance to MFIs to build their own networks with apex organizations for 
effective guidance, supervision, training and consultancy services, the dissemination of 
strategies geared to viability and sustainability and of product innovations, liquidity exchange, 
and last-resort-access to sources of refinance. Lack of adequate guidance and supervision of 
MFIs seems to be the biggest shortcoming in every countries, particularly with regard to 
microfinance NGOs and financial cooperatives. 
 
Donors may utilize the opportunities offered by the crisis to refocus their role on: 
•  strengthening the institutional autonomy of MFIs, with an emphasis on viability and 
sustainability; 
•  building apex organizations of MFIs, with an emphasis on prudential self-regulation and 
effective supervision of adherence to performance standards; 




Particular donor interventions must be tailor-made for each particular country, based on given 
conditions in the policy and legal environment, the microfinance infrastructure, the 
opportunity structure of low-income groups, and their effective demand for financial services. 
Standardized replications of single strategies or institutional models are to be avoided. This 
requires a careful analysis of the situation in each country first.  
 
With regard to Indonesia as an example preliminary observations in October 1998 led to the 
following tentative suggestions: 
  2a. Following the example of the BRI units and other market-oriented SFIs, all the 
institutions, formal or nonformal, must strive to mobilize their own resources, cover their 
costs from the interest rate margin and finance their further expansion from their profits 
b.  The Government is to implement effectively its own policies of avoiding, or phasing out, 
interest rate subsidies, loan channeling and agricultural price controls, which all 
undermine rural financial and factor markets  
c.  The capacity of existing small financial institutions (such as BRI units, rural banks and 
other SFIs) is to be strengthened to provide a full range of financial services at market 
terms to all segments of the population including small farmers, micro-entrepreneurs and 
the landless 
d.  New local financial institutions (such as financial cooperatives and the self-help groups 
under IDT, PHBK, P4K and others) are to be assisted to evolve into self-reliant financial 
intermediaries under effective guidance and supervision 
e.  Viable and sustainable forms of rural and peri-urban microfinance are to be expanded 
through systematic cooperation between the staff of the financial institutions and the field 
extension workers of the various other line agencies  
f.  Innovative financial strategies, schemes and products (encompassing savings, credit and 
insurance products) geared to higher agricultural and microenterprise incomes are to be 
collected and disseminated 
g.  Bank Indonesia is to take responsibility for effective financial guidance and supervision of 
SFIs including financial cooperatives and self-help groups, which may be delegated to 
duly supervised second-tier regulatory authorities as apexes of MFI networks. 
 
To further strengthen rural finance, support may be given in the form of equity grants to SFIs, 
grants for institution-building, and technical assistance for disseminating financial 
innovations, developing apex structures, facilitating linkages with higher-level financial 
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1.  The challenge of the Asian financial crisis 
Years of steady economic growth, expanding banking and microfinance sectors and declining 
poverty turned a number of Asian countries into models of development. Among them were 
South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. When the financial crisis broke out, the 
Asian miracle appeared to be over. It was feared that the gains of past decades might be lost 
within months. Indonesia, with over 200 million inhabitants the largest of the affected 
countries, was hit hardest. Previously a model case of prudential deregulation, expanding 
banking services, the attainment of rice self-sufficiency, economic diversification, and 
massive poverty alleviation from 60% of its population in 1970 to 11.5 % in 1996, it now 
suffered from a triple crisis: the collapse of its currency, a prolonged drought, and the 
breakdown of its political system. There is a danger that in Indonesia alone up to 100 million 
people may sink back into poverty.  
 
A crisis is also an opportunity: to reexamine the strengths and flaws of the system; uncover its 
cracks and moot points; devise strategies of strengthening the health of the system and its 
institutions; and prevent similar future crises in other countries. Our core concern in this 
context is to draw lessons from the crisis in order to build resilient microfinance systems with 
sustainable services for low-income groups.  
 
Two types of crises need to be analytically separated: those arising from financial and 
economic mismanagement; and those arising from natural disasters such as droughts and 
floods. In the case of Indonesia, the effects of both are confounded. The main emphasis in this 
paper is on the financial and economic crisis, which requires more fundamental responses. 
Natural disasters are basic risks which may be dealt with in a more technical manner in terms 
of insurance-type contract savings, risk management and reinsurance on the one hand and 
emergency aid on the other hand. 
 
Past regulatory practices have resulted in policy environments, legal frameworks and financial 
infrastructures that have created both opportunities and impediments for microfinance. These 
need to be examined first before the impact of the crisis can be fully understood. 
 
 
2.  The policy and legal framework 
 
The lessons of financial repression  
Most Asian countries have gone through a period of financial repression, characterized to 
varying extents by rigid state control over the establishment and expansion of financial 
institutions, widespread state ownership of banks, regulated interest rates, government control 
over foreign exchange, and directed credit programs. Domestic resource mobilization was 
discouraged. Credit by government-owned development finance institutions remained 
severely restricted; and savings deposit facilities to the rural and urban poor were largely 
absent. Repayment rates to agricultural development banks like ADBN in Nepal, BRI in 
Indonesia or Land Bank in the Philippines tended to fluctuate below 50%. 
 
Indonesia is the country where the turn-around in 1983 away from financial repression was 
most proncouned. Before 1983, interest rates were regulated; the financial sector was 
dominated by state-banks; and the establishment of new banks and bank branches was 
severely restricted. Only semiformal financial institutions, of which over 5,000 had been set 
up under provincial law since the 1970s with an initial capital injection by local government,  
were allowed to mobilize their own resources through the income earned from a range of 
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agricultural and small enterprise credit was Bank Indonesia (BI), the central bank. Guided by 
the triple development goal of Equity, Growth and Stability, Indonesia used its oil revenues to 
provide between 75 and 100% of the funding for a vast array of priority programs. It might be 
that this had a positive impact on economic development and distributional equity as indicated 
by the attainment of self-sufficiency in food production in 1984 and a substantial reduction in 
poverty. However, as surveys showed that rice harvests improved more in areas where 
BIMAS loans were not available, it appears that preferential credit directed resources to low-
yielding investments and that the progress achieved might have been due to other factors. 
When at the beginning of the 1980s oil prices dropped and a world recession set in, it became 
increasingly costly for Indonesia to maintain its repressive financial regime and cover the 
huge losses of its state banks and preferential credit programs. The GNP growth rate dropped 
from a five-year average of 8% during 1977-81 to 2.2% in 1982; balance of payment and 
current account deficits soared, and government banks had become dependent on central bank 
liquidity as their chief source of funds. At the beginning of the 1980s, savings and time 
deposits as a proportion of GDP was below 4%, and money supply (M2) below 15% of GDP. 
 
Financial repression turned out be costly. During a ten-year period for which World Bank data 
are available, a single small enterprise credit scheme (KIK/KMKP) absorbed unrecovered 
subsidies amounting to $1.6 billion. Directed targeted credit failed to reach sufficient numbers 
of low-income groups; national economies failed to build up their domestic resource base; 
institutions failed to evolve as self-reliant financial intermediaries; and small farmers, 
microentrepreneurs and the poor failed to strengthen their self-help and self-financing 
capacity. There is evidence that most of subsidies were grabbed by the non-poor, and that any 
additionality effects (in terms of additional investments as a result of credit) are highly 
questionable.  One lesson that may be drawn from the negative experience with subsidized 
targeted credit is that a return to such practices at times of crisis is unlikely to be beneficial; to 
the contrary, it may further undermine the health of MFIs already weakened by the crisis.  
 
3.  Macro-level reforms of the policy and legal framework: lasting foundations?  
 
The Indonesian experience 
Indonesia, unlike Thailand, is the country started deregulation with the financial sector in the 
lead, progressing in clearly delineated steps. In June 1983, it boldly embarked onto the road to 
a market economy. With the objective of diversifying its production, strengthening its export 
sector and unleashing its domestic resources, it gradually deregulated its financial system and 
foreign trade regime. Since then and up to the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
prudential deregulation of interest rates, the easing of the conditions to set up new banks and 
branches, macroeconomic stability (a key factor preceding financial deregulation!) and close 
communication between the government and the banking and MFI sector have greatly 
contributed to financial deepening, economic growth, the development of the financial 
infrastructure,  and increased access to financial services by low-income groups. Deregulation 
of the monetary and banking system proceeded in the following steps: 
•  1983:  Interest rate autonomy was given to all banks, state-owned and private. Bank 
Indonesia (BI) as the central bank dropped direct interest rate controls and adopted market-
oriented monetary policies. Between 1983 and 1990 savings mobilization increased 6.7-
fold, bank loans outstanding 6.4-fold. From 1990 to 1995 savings mobilization increased 
2.5-fold, bank loans outstanding 2.4-fold. 
•  1988:  BI deregulated the institutional framework by easing the establishment of new 
banks and the opening of branch branches. A new rural banking law permited the 
establishment of rural banks (BPR) with an equity capital of Rp. 50 million, requiring that 
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1,643 rural banks (BPR) were established until 1995. The total number of registered small 
financial institutions grew from 8,003 in 1990 to 9,271 in 1995; the number of commercial 
banks from 171 to 240; and the number of their branches from 3,563 to 5,191. 
•  1990:  BI abolished most of the interest rate subsidies, terminating 32 out of 36 directed 
credit programs.This forced banks to rely almost fully on resources mobilized from the 
public. To absorb the shock of the abrupt liquidity withdrawal on the small enterprise 
sector, BI required commercial banks to allocate 20% of their portfolio to the 
microeconomy, either directly or through MFIs. 
•  1991:  In response to some spectacular bank failures, BI stepped up bank supervision and 
imposed a capital adequacy ratio. 
•  1992:  A new banking act deregulated bank ownership. Only two types of banks were 
recognized: commercial banks und rural banks (BPR) with a paid-in capital of Rp10b 
(US$. 4.82m, at 1992 exchange rates) and Rp50m ($24,100), respectively. 
 
In response to the change in the policy environment, banks engaged in vigorous campaigns of 
savings mobilization and credit delivery at market rates of interest. To attract deposits, banks 
competed with each other by offering a variety of savings products with different terms and 
highly positive real returns. This led to an upsurge in domestic resource mobilization, 
reversing at the same time the outflow of capital. From 1982, the last pre-deregulation year, to 
1996, the last pre-crisis year, savings and time deposits (excluding demand and foreign 
exchange deposits) increased 67-fold in nominal and 21-fold in real terms. Savings deposits, 
which are mostly held by low-income groups, grew 126-fold in nominal terms and 39-fold in 
real terms - much faster than time deposits, in which the rich hold their money, which 
increased 54-fold in nominal and 17-fold in real terms. (Annex 1) This shows that, (a) the 
poor, or low-income people, do save; and (b) the poor respond to opportunities and incentives 
to save. The banking crisis disrupted this pattern of steady growth: During the 18-months 
period, Jan. 1997 to June 1998, savings and time deposits nominally increased by 59% but fell 
by 15% in real terms. During the same period, the ratio of M2/GDP, a standard measure of 
financial deepening, increased from 17.5% to 54.2% (Annex 2). The shape of the curve 
presents visual evidence that policies work: The curve shows a definite incline after 1984, the 
first full year after interest rate deregulation. 1986 is the year of a major devaluation of the 
Rupiah, resulting in some leveling-off of the curve. This is followed by a sharp incline of the 
curve after 1988, the year of banking liberalization and the enactment of the new rural 
banking law. In 1990 it started to level off when Bank Indonesia pulled the tight money policy 
breakes. 
 
4.  Lessons of the Asian crisis: the pitfalls of deregulation without supervision  
 
While many Asian countries have started to deregulate their financial and economic systems, 
none has done so completely; and none has fully abandoned practices of interference 
generally recognized as detrimental. Virtually every country has maintained a number of 
directed credit programs (over 70 in the Philippines, and a moderate four in Indonesia); 
 and none has fully exhausted its domestic resource potential.  
 
Indonesia seems to present the clearest case of a flawed system. While deregulation was 
successful, banking supervision of the fast-growing financial institutions proved inadequate, 
causing a financial, economic and political crisis of alarming dimensions. Weaknesses in bank 
supervision had been apparent all along, to which BI responded in 1991, though ineffectively. 
The fact of politically instigated lending was also known, but not its excessive extent. The 
belief was upheld that in a climate of rapid economic growth, the healthy portion of the 
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of an autocratic political economy without democratic controls, this belief turned out to be 
erroneous.  
 
The situation was aggravated by a second flaw which had gone largely undetected by Bank 
Indonesia: the extent of foreign exchange exposure particularly of corporations directly 
endebted to foreign banks; and its short-term structure. Given a relatively high level of 
domestic interest rates, corporations found it cheaper, or more convenient, to borrow abroad 
rather than to borrow domestically (ignoring the exchange rate risk), or to raise funds on the 
capital market, respectively. When the crisis spread from Thailand, panic broke out, resulting 
in a flight of foreign investors and a bank run of domestic depositors, with spiraling effects. 
The Rupiah slumped from around 2,500 to the dollar in mid-1997 to 15,000 in mid-1998. 
Inflation went up from single digit figures (7.0% in 4/1993-3/1994, 8.6% in 1994/95, 8.9% in 
1995/96 and 5.2% in 1996/97) to 34.2% in 4/1997-3/1998, with an unprecedented peak of 
12.7% in 2/1998, slowing down to monthly rates around 5% between March and June 1998. 
In 1998, the inflation rate may reach as much as 80%.  
 
Aggravated by two successive droughts in 1997 and 1998 and worsened by runs on rice stores 
to hoard the scarce commodity, food prices increased even more drastically, culminating in a 
tripling of the price of rice, the staple food in Indonesia. The rise in food prices had two 
effects: an incentive effect for agricultural producers, particularly on export crops, diminished 
at the same time by the scarcity and soaring costs of imported inputs (particularly fertilizer, 
chemicals and animal feeds); and soaring costs for food particularly among the rural and 
urban poor, with the new urban unemployed the most disadvantaged.  
 
There are three regulatory reform measures which form an essential triad for sustained 
financial and economic growth: macroeconomic stability, prudential deregulation, and 
effective bank supervision. Indonesia performed well on stability (until mid-1997) and 
deregulation, but failed on bank supervision. This, in the wider framework of the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, led to a bank run, the collapse of the Rupiah, soaring inflation, 
massive unemployment, and, last but not least, political instability. Microfinance was least 
affected, indicating that MFIs at the local level applied sound banking practices and avoided 
political influence. The chief lesson of the Indonesian experience is that financial deregulation 
without adequate bank supervision can be disastrous; and furthermore, that financial 
liberalization within an autocratically ruled political system may open up new and 
uncontrolled avenues for political interference. 
 
 
5.  Microfinance in Indonesia  
 
5.1  Origins and development  
Indonesia has one of the most differentiated microfinance infrastructures, with colonial 
origins dating back to the end of the 19
th century
1. The recent history of microfinance in 
Indonesia progressed in three major phases. In first phase, after the upheavals of 1965, the 
government, building on pre-war foundations, established two types of rural and 
microfinance institutions:  
                                                 
1 Documented by L.Th. Schmit, Rural Credit Between Subsidy and Market: Adjustment of the Village Units of 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia in Sociological Perspective. Leiden Development Studies No. 11. Rijksuniversiteit 
Leiden Leiden (Belgium) 1991; Richard H. Patten & J.K. Rosengard, The development of Rural Banking in 
Indonesia. ICS Press, San Francisco 1991 
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(kecamatan) units, of a government-owned agricultural development bank, Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI), to channel subsidized credit under BIMAS to small farmers targeted at 
rice self-sufficiency.  
(b) a decentralized system of semiformal financial institutions under provincial law, which 
were supposed to be guided and supervised by regional development banks (BPD) and 
BRI. Some of the best-known provincial networks are the BKK (owned by local 
government) in Central Java, the LPN (owned cooperatively) in West Sumatra and the 
LPD (owned by the village community) in Bali.
2  
 
The Government’s strategies in setting up these two systems differed in essential ways: 
(a) In the case of BRI, it fully funded the creation of a formal infrastructure under a special 
law of over 2,000 (now over 4,000) BRI units and the concomitant selection and training 
of staff. It also provided the loanable funds and an annual budget for subsidies on interest 
rates and operational costs. Given repayment rates around 40%, the Government also 
picked up the substantial loan losses. While the program turned out to be unsustainable, 
the Government had made at the same time a lasting initial investment in the rural 
financial infrastructure. 
(b) The semiformal financial institutions were set up outside the formal financial sector and 
therefore not subject to interest rate regulation. Equipped with a small seed capital grant 
(rather than a loan, which would have caused excessive transaction costs and moral 
hazard) by the Government, these small financial institutions (SFIs) were essentially 
designed to be self-reliant providers of microcredit. They mobilized their own resources 
not through savings but through high interest rates while their administrative costs were 
low. These SFIs show how governments may set up viable and sustainable SFIs in a 
financially repressive environment: through exemptions from interest rate regulation and 
reliance on internal resource mobilization after a pump-priming seed grant. 
 
In response to the world recession of the early 1980s, the Government initiated a second 
phase through the deregulation of interest rates in June 1983 and the discontinuation of the 
BIMAS program. Faced with the prospect of closing down the units and dismissing their staff, 
BRI, under new leadership (Kamardi Arif), decided to build up a microfinance scheme on 
commercial terms, operational as of 1984. With the long-term technical assistance of HIID 
and a start-up World Bank loan, BRI developed two highly successful financial products: a 
savings product with a lottery component and positive real returns, SIMPEDES; and a single 
village-level credit product, KUPEDES, with interest rates designed to cover all costs and 
finance its expansion, universal monthly instalments without a grace period and highly 
effective incentives for timely repayment.  This made BRI one of the world’s most successful 
microfinance providers: viable and fully financially self-sufficient since 1989. The BRI units, 
which are profit centers with staff incentive schemes, mobilize their own loanable resources 
plus a rapidly growing amount of excess liquidity; they are the only profitable part of BRI; 
and they are so profitable that the have made the whole bank profitable: the only one among 
all government banks in Indonesia. One of the less conspicuous, but perhaps most important 
aspects of BRI’s microfinance operations is their integrated banking software, financial 
monitoring and supervision system, producing daily results at the unit level and monthly 
results at the national level. 
 
                                                 
2 Seibel, H.D., Finance with the Poor, by the Poor, for the Poor. Financial Technologies for the Informal Sector, 
with Case Studies from Indonesia. Social Strategies vol. 3 no. 2. Basel University, CH-4051 Basel, 1989 
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establishment of new banks and bank branches. It also provided a new legal status for the 
establishment of formal sector rural banks (BPR) at subdistrict level with an equity capital of 
Rp 50 million (approx. $25,000 at 1988 exchange rates, $5,000 at Oct 6, 1998, exchange 
rates) under central bank supervision. At the same time, this  law opened up mandatory 
avenue for the upgrading of semiformal to formal financial institutions within a five-year 
period, which has been successively extended. The law offered two types of BPR ownership: 
private or cooperative (excluding community ownership). Under the restrictions imposed on 
cooperatives (KUD) by a presidential decree until early 1998, the vast majority of the over 
2,000 BPR established between 1988 and 1998 were private banks.   
 
5.2  The microfinance infrastructure 
Indigenous origins, private initiatives and government interventions have produced a highly 
differentiated financial infrastructure of over 6,000 financial institutions and offices belonging 
to the formal financial sector; over 5,000 semiformal financial institutions reporting to Bank 
Indonesia; over 5,000 other semiformal financial institutions, some 900,000 self-help groups 
registered with some government agency, plus an infinite number of informal financial 
institutions (among them the ubiquitous rotating savings associations, arisan)– all catering for 
the financial needs of various layers of low-income groups. (Table 1) The rural and 
microfinance infrastructure thus comprises five major subsectors:  
 
a.  Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), a government-owned commercial bank with a rural and 
agricultural mandate, was recently reorganized into four divisions: a Treasury and 
Investment Division, a Corporate Banking Division for loans above Rp 3 billion 
($300,000) including dollar loans; a Retail Banking Division with 323 branches which 
offer savings deposit services, provide loans on commercial terms from Rp 25 million to 
Rp 3 billion ($2,500-300,000), and handle the remaining subsidized targeted credit 
programs; and a Micro Banking Division, the only profit-making part of BRI, with 4,085 
outlets (2,566 village units, 379 village posts and 1,220 peri-urban units. Mobile units for 
(peri-) urban areas are under preparation. The BRI units account for more than half the 
total assets of some 15-16,000 SFIs. The units, which are profit centers with a staff of 4 to 
11, offer passbook savings and time deposit services; and individual non-targeted 
KUPEDES loans with monthly instalments and market rates of interest) ranging from Rp 
25,000 to Rp 25 million (unadjusted in size since the crisis), or $2.50-$2,500. No group 
loans are disbursed by the units. Interest rates under KUPEDES are being adjusted as of 1 
October 1998 from a flat rate of 1.5% per month (33% eff. p.a.) + a refundable timely-
repayment incentive of 0.5% (received by 95% of the borrrowers) to 2.2% p.m. (48% eff. 
p.a.) + a refundable timely-repayment incentive of 0.73%. The majority of customers of 
the rural units are small traders, small farmers and other microentrepreneurs. Of the 
customers at the peri-urban units, over 50%  belong to the informal sector. As of 8/1998, 
the BRI units had: 
20.93 million savings deposit accounts with Rp 15.13 trillion ($1.51 billion) balances; 
  2.51 borrowers with Rp 4.61 trillion ($0.46 billion) loans outstanding.  
b.  There are 2,227 (6/1998), mostly private, rural banks (BPR), with over 6 million 
customers. Minimum capital requirements (Rp 50 million, which were approx. $25,000 in 
1988, now $5,000) have remained unadjusted since the crisis. Their assets are on average 
around Rp 1.5 billion ($150,000 at the 6 Oct. 1998 exchange rate), with a relatively strong 
equity base of 23% before the crisis. With average loan sizes of Rp 1 million ($100) and 
average savings balances of Rp 130,000 ($ 13), they serve the lower microfinance market. 
  9(Reille & Gallmann 1998:11-12)
3. In 6/1998, total assets amounted to Rp 2.93 trillion, 
total savings deposits to somewhat over Rp. 1.5 trillion and loans outstanding to 
somewhat below Rp 2 trillion. 
c.  There are over 7,000 semiformal financial institutions: 5345 Badan Kredit Desa (BPR-
BKD) and 1809 Lembaga Dana Kredit Pedesaan (LDKP) under the supervision of BRI 
and provincial development banks (BPD), respectively (6/1998). They are all included in 
BI’s reporting system. 
d.  There are over 2,000 private credit unions (KOPDIT) under the Credit Union 
Coordinating Office; plus savings and credit cooperatives (koperasi simpan pinjam) 
under the Ministry of Cooperatives which since the deregulation of the cooperative sector 
in 1998 (INPRES No. 18) are expected to grow dynamically. Their financial supervision 
is not controlled by Bank Indonesia and practically inexistent: presumably the biggest 
hindrance to their development into sound SFIs. 
e.  Below this is a vast number of financial SHGs, among them an unknown number of 
indigenous groups, several thousand groups under NGO guidance, some 50,000 groups 
under P4K/MoA, some 25,000 groups (KUBE) under the Ministry of Social Affairs, some 
15,000 groups linked to 819 bank offices (mostly BPR) under PHBK/BI (with a portfolio 
of Rp 36.8 billion in 5/1998), 136,000 groups in 28,376 poor villages under 
IDT/BAPPENAS, and 667,000 women’s groups with secondary financial activities under 
BKKBN. The IDT groups (Lembaga Keuangan Alternatif, LKA) receive seed revolving 
grants and are to evolve into savings & credit cooperatives as self-reliant intermediaries. 
BAPPENAS expects that by coordinating eight line ministries with their self-help group 
structures under IDT, a network of local financial self-help institutions will eventually 
cover all 65,000 villages of Indonesia, with an apex structure of rural banks (BPR) at sub-
district level. According to BAPPENAS sources, effective financial management 
mechanisms are to be developed to bring their financial supervision, which is separate 
from their institutional supervision, under the authority of Bank Indonesia.  
Figures on those institutions which report to BI are summarized in Table 1. 
 














Type  No.   Number  Percent Number Percent Number Percent  Number  Percent
BRI units
1 4,085  20.06  78.0 2.57 52.2 13.58 85.7  4.59  68.7
BPR 2,227  4.96  19.3 1.57 31.9 2.07 13.1  1.97  29.5
BKD 5,345  0.71  2.8 0.78 15.8 0.20 1.3  0.12  1.8
Total  11,657  25.73  100.1 4.92 99.9 15.85 100.1  6.68  100.0
Sources: BRI: Monthly monitoring data; BPR and BKD: Bank Indonesia 10/1998 
1  Data for the number of BRI units include village posts   
2  The term deposits includes passbook and other savings and time deposits 
3  In the figures for BRI units equity is excluded 
 
The BRI  units and small financial institutions differ in terms of source of loanable funds: 
BRI’s units are totally savings & deposit-driven, without an equity component or commercial 
borrowings. Their main source of funds are passbook savings, accounting for 73.4%; the 
remaining 26.6% are generated by time deposits. BRI’s most successful savings product is 
SIMPEDES in rural areas (53.0% of all funds) and SIMASKOT in peri-urban areas (11.0% of 
all funds), both passbook savings with a lottery component. At the other extreme are the 
                                                 
3 Xavier Reille (CRS) & Dominique Gallmann (GTZ/PHBK), The Indonesian People’s Credit Banks (BPRs) and 
the Financial Crisis. Second Annual Seminar on New Development Finance, Frankfurt, 9/1998 
  10BKDs, which are equity-driven: 87.2% of their funds are equity, 8.4% passbook savings and 
4.4% borrowings. The BPR are also savings & deposit-driven, but not exclusively: 35.5% of 
their funds are generated by time deposits and 22.8% by passbook savings, together 58.3%. 
Equity accounts for another 21.3%, and bank borrowings for 20.3%. (Table 2) 
 
Table 2:  Sources of loanable funds of rural financial institutions  
reporting to Bank Indonesia (in percent),  6/1998 
Source of funds  BRI  BPR BKD
Passbook savings  73.4  22.8 8.4
Time deposits  26.6  35.5 0
Bank borrowings  0  21.3 4.4
Equity 0  20.3 87.2
Total percent  100.0  99.9 100.0
Amount in Rp trillion  13.58  2.59 0.21
Source of raw data:  BRI: Monthly monitoring data; BPR and BKD: Bank Indonesia 10/1998 
 
The BRI are units are the biggest provider of rural financial services (Table 1). The three 
types of financial institutions which report to Bank Indonesia probably account for around 
90% of total rural finance. Of these, BRI holds 78% of all savings deposit accounts and 52.2% 
of all loan accounts. In terms of volume, BRI accounts for 85.7% of all savings deposits and 
68.7% of loans outstanding. Second in importance are the rural banks (BPR) which account 
for around 30% of borrowers and loans outstanding; their share of savings deposit services is 
smaller: 19.3% in terms of number of depositors and 13.1% in terms of the volume of 
deposits. The vast number of semiformal village institutions, BKD (excluding the LDKP, 
which do not report to BI) carry little weight, except in terms of number of borrowers.  
 
As of 6/1998, the BRI units and the rural banks (BPR) together held over 4 million loan 
accounts and 25 million savings deposit accounts, with an increase to 26 million by 8/1998. 
They were held by about 24 million individuals or perhaps 18-20 million households: an 
outreach to almost half the population. 
 
5.3  Directed credit programs: their functions and dysfunctions 
There are four directed credit programs, which were left after Bank Indonesia discontinued 32 
out of 36 subsidized targeted credit programs in 1991. They are  handled by private and 
government banks including BRI at the branch (not unit!) level, but not by rural banks (BPR): 
KUT, a program for members of informal farmers groups to increase food production 
(Rp 399 billion outstandings as of 6/1998) 
KKUD, a cooperative (KUD) credit program (Rp 139 billion outstandings) 
KKPA-TRI, a program for cooperative (KUD) members for sugar intensification  
(Rp 219 billion)  
KKUD-Umum for general loans to cooperative (KUD) members (Rp 1447 billion) 
In addition there are projects (Rp 23 billion outstandings) like P4K, a poverty alleviation 
program for small groups of farmers and the landless initially funded by IFAD. Total directed 
credit outstanding amounts to Rp 2.23 trillion (6/1998), Rp 2.06 of this for agriculture. In 
addition, there exists a rice distribution and stabilization program, BULOG, which is handled 
at the BRI corporate level.  
 
The directed credit programs are determined by government agencies. Sound procedures of 
creditworthiness examination are lacking; no market terms and conditions are applied. Interest 
rates are a fraction of the current rural market rates: 14% to KUT and 16% to the other three 
programs, a third of the interest rate charged by the BRI units and about a quarter of the 
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which have lost part of their liquidity, at an interest rate of 30% which is above the costs of 
passbook savings but far below the costs of fixed deposits, which micht have a discouraging 
effect on the mobilization of higher-cost domestic savings. 
 
Program credit bypasses the existing rural SFIs and  confronts them with an unfair 
competition of ultracheap credit. Program lending has suffered from high arrears up to 60% in 
the past. According to official statistics, arrears (amount overdue divided by loans 
outstanding) were 31% for KUT, 18% for KKUD and 13% for KKPA (7/1998). The 
Government recently wrote off Rp 117 billion of defaulted KUT loans for 1985-1995; another 
Rp 165 billion of KUT loans disbursed during 1995-97 are being rescheduled. It is expected 
that in 1998/99, an additional budget of Rp 4.3 trillion will be available for fresh KUT loans, 
which may vastly surpass the delivery capacity of the institutions and the absorptive capacity 
of the farmers. At the same time, the BRI units have a surplus liquidity around Rp 10 trillion 
which they are unable to re-lend at village level with their present delivery system. Moreover, 
SFIs have successfully devised instruments of domestic savings mobilization and credit 
delivery at market rates, with yet a vast unexhausted potential. As long as there is surplus 
liquidity in the rural financial sector (Rp 10 trillion in the case of the BRI units!) and the SFI 
potential for resource mobilization is far from being exhausted, there is thus no justification 
for injecting targeted subsidized loanable funds. The real challenge is the deepening of 
financial services by the existing SFIs and the development of financial cooperatives and self-
help groups into effective financial intermediaries with sustainable financial services to all 
small farmers and microentrepreneurs. 
 
 
6.  The impact of the crisis on microfinance in Indonesia 
 
The impact of the crisis on MFIs has not been uniform, bringing out both the strengths and the 
weaknesses of different subsectors. However, one basic observation applies to the sector as a 
whole: While the commercial banking sector is at the verge of collapse, microfinance has 
weathered the crisis well. This testifies on the one hand to the strength of the legal and 
institutional foundations of the microfinance sector, its self-reliance, and the public’s trust in 
MFIs; and on the other hand to the absence of the two fundamental problems of the 
commercial banks: political interference in lending decisions; and excessive foreign exchange 
risk exposure of the banks and their clients. In contrast, microfinance institutions have 
mobilized their own resources domestically; and most of them have applied sound lending 
practices.  
 
6.1. Rural  banks 
On a more detailed level, the impact of the crisis has been somewhat negative on rural banks 
(BPR) and many semiformal SFIs, which together account for less than half of the rural 
microfinance portfolio, and stunningly positive on the BRI units, which account for more than 
half the portfolio. From 6/1997 to 6/1998, total assets of BPR remained nominally stable, 
decreasing by a mere 0.6% from Rp 2.95 trillion to Rp 2.93 trillion. Loans outstanding 
decreased by -7.6% and savings and term deposits by –9.6% (Reille & Gallmann 1998:12). 
However, given an inflation rate of 48% during that period, this is a substantial decline in real 
terms. The crisis has brought those BPR to the brink of  bankruptcy which were already weak 
before the crisis, particularly in the area around Jakarta. Many BRP have experienced a 
liquidity crunch due to two factors: the transfer of part of their liquidity (estimated at 20%) to 
commercial banks under government deposit guarantees; and the drying up of borrowings 
from illiquid commercial banks which were required, since 1991, to lend a 20% quota of their 
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result of government interference. In response to BPR requests, the government has now 
extended its deposit guarantees to BPR (at the risk of moral hazard) and provided for their 
access to Bank Indonesia liquidity at 30% (at the risk of discouraging local resource 
mobilization and distorting rural financial markets).  
 
6.2. Linkage  banking 
PHBK/BI’s 15,000 SHGs experienced a decline in the repayment rate (mostly to BPR) from 
96% (principal only) before the crisis to 90% in 6/1998. Loan losses as of  5/1998 reportedly 
were 0.9%, testifying to the overall resilience of linkage banking under Bank Indonesia’s 
supervision (with GTZ TA).
4 Compared to the experience of P4K (see below), which solely 
relies on BRI as a source of (re-) finance, it appears that the PHBK management was right in 
shifting from BRI and other commercial banks to rural banks (BPR) as local partners of 
SHGs.  
 
6.3. Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
Total savings deposits in BRI almost doubled during the crisis year 9/1997-8/1998: in the 
BRI units from Rp 7.98 trillion in 8/1997 to Rp 15.13 trillion in 8/1998 (+89.6%); and in all 
of BRI from Rp 17.86 trillion to Rp 35.17 trillion (+96.9%): an increase well above the 
inflation rate (46.7% for 9/97-6/98, estimated at 56% for 9/97-8/98). During the three-month 
period June-August, 1998, after Indonesia had been hit by both a drought and an economic 
crisis, 1.29 million new savings deposit accounts were opened (bringing the total up to 20.93 
million accounts by approx. 18-19 million clients) in BRI units; and an additional Rp 2.84 
trillion ($284 million at the Oct. 6, 1998, exchange rate) were deposited there. During the 
same time period, total deposits in BRI as a whole increased by Rp 3.72 trillion to Rp 35.17 
trillion. It is assumed that part of these savings are deposited in the BRI units by farmers who 
profit from high agricultural prices. There is no simultaneous increase in the credit portfolio, 
which stood at Rp 4.61 trillion in 8/98 (up only 4.5% from Rp 4.41 trillion in 8/97). The BRI 
units have more than Rp 10 trillion in excess liquidity, indicating a capacity for domestic 
resource mobilization which the rural banks and other SFIs are still far from having 
exhausted. 
 
It has been noted that because of uncertainty over future developments, people have been 
cautious to take up new loans. Accordingly, the number of BRI KUPEDES borrowers which 
has been steadily increasing from 640,746 in Dec. 1984 to 2,615, 696 in Dec. 1997, has now 
stagnated. During 1998 it has actually declined every single month: from a peak of 2,628,559 
in January to 2,508,049 in August: a decrease of -4.6% for that eight-month period; and.a 
decrease of –1.4% since August 1997. The amount of loans outstanding has continued to 
increase slowly in nominal terms from Rp. 4.41 trillion in August 1997 to Rp 4.69 in Dec. 
1997. After a nominal peak of Rp 4.75 trillion in January 1998, it declined to Rp 4.55 trillion 
in May and reached Rp 4.61 trillion in August 1998. The amount of loans outstanding has 
thus decreased by 3.0% during the first eight months of 1998; since August 1997, it has 
increased by 4.5%. 
 
Since 1989, the BRI units have produced excess liquidity of an ever widening gap. In August 
1998, savings deposits in the BRI units were more than three times the amount of loans 
                                                 
4 In its survey on the impact of the crisis on microfinance, the Foundation for Developmenu Cooperation notes 
that “Repayment rates for the PHBK program ... have been relatively stable. The monthly on-time repayment 
rate for January 1998 was 96.6 per cent, slightly higher than the 96.0% per cent recorded in June 1997.” 
B.W.T.P. (Banking With The Poor) Network Newsletter No. 11, June 1998, p. 4) 
  13oustanding: savings of Rp 15.13 trillion exceeded loans outstanding of Rp 4.61 trillion by Rp 
10.52 trillion ($ 1.05 billion by the Oct 6, 1998, exchange rate).  
 
The proportion of agricultural lending by BRI units has increased only slightly from 17.8% 
in 1/1997 to 18.8% in 12/1997 and 19.3% in 7/1998. The increase is somewhat more 
pronounced in terms of monthly disbursements: from 18.9% during 1/1997 to 23.9% in 
12/1997 to 23.4% in 7/1998. However, given the fungibility of money, the actual increase 
might be higher, as loans for small trade and other micro-enterprise activities, which are 
easier to obtain, and the profits thereof may be invested to a larger extent in agricultural 
activities which are now far more profitable than before. This issue of agricultural financing 
within the economies of households requires further study. 
 
The crisis had no negative effect on repayment in BRI’s microfinance operations, testifying 
to the resilience of both the BRI village units and their farmer and microenterprise customers. 
The 12-month loss ratio (2.16%) during the crisis period (9/1997-8/1998) is virtually identical 
with the long-term loss ratio since 1984 (2.17%). In 8/1998, BRI experienced an 
unprecedented negative one-month loss-ratio (-0.21%): more than what was due was repaid. 
 
6.4. P4K 
P4K, an IFAD-funded poverty alleviation project in the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), 
appears less affected by the crisis than by its internal weaknesses.
5  Key data are presented 
below. 
 
Table 3:  Key monitoring data on P4K, Income-Generating Project for Marginal 
Farmers and the Landless, Indonesia (June 1998) 
 
Total number of SFGs formed:     49,917 
Total SFGs with bank savings  34,853 
Total SFGs with group savings:    20,542 
SFGs with credit outstanding:    16,104 
SFGs with arrears          6,848 
Percentage of groups with arrears  42.5% 
Number if SFGs without arrears  9,256 
Loans outstanding:   Rp. 21.20 billion 
Arrears (amount overdue by loans outstanding):  23.4% 
Bank deposits:         Rp 6.34 billion  
Bank deposits in percent of loans outstanding  29.9% 
Group savings:        Rp 1.95 billion 
Number of intergroup associations:    1,805 
Number of groups in associations:    8,996 
Average size of associations:   5 groups 
 
50,000 small farmer groups (SFGs), comprising 35.0% men’s, 37.5% women’s and 27.5% 
mixed groups, were formed, mostly during the past ten years by MoA field extension workers, 
responding to material incentives to establish SFGs of 10 poor members each. Groups are 
required to deposit compulsory savings in BRI branches (not units!) and submit a business 
plan to be eligible for a loan by BRI. Only somewhat over two thirds of the groups (69.8%) 
have deposited compulsory savings in BRI; and less than one third (32.3%) have loans 
                                                 
5 Further research would be needed to disaggregate the effects of the crisis and structural weaknesses of the 
project. 
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and group savings together are equivalent to 39.1% of total loans outstanding. 42.5% of the 
groups have arrears, amounting to 23.4% of loans outstanding. As much as half the groups 
may be dormant. The actual number is unknown, as there is neither a drop-out policy for 
groups which do not qualify for credit; nor a graduation policy for groups no longer in need of 
credit. BRI and P4K do not report on the number of groups waiting (perhaps in vain) for 
credit. About 9,000 groups have taken the initative of organizing themselves in a total of 
1,805 intergroup associations, which are self-organized local financial intermediaries of five 
groups on average. This may be the hard-core of active groups; some of them may stand on 
their own feed and no longer have loans outstanding. 
 
It appears that the crisis is bringing out the strengths and weaknesses of the project as 
indicated by the author during the 1993 IFAD evaluation and the 1994 UNDP consultancy. 
The main weakness lies in the loan channeling approach through BRI, which handles the 
loans on behalf of the government and without any commercial interest of its own through its 
branches, which unlike the units are far from the people. When arrears in a given village or 
subdistrict exceed 5%, BRI stops credit disbursement in that respective area. There are cases 
where two out of 32 SFGs are in arrears, but due to BRI’s policy the 30 SFGs in good 
standing are also excluded from further access to credit. This in turn leads to a spreading 
unwillingness to repay. As BRI continues to restrict the volume of new loans, the loan 
portfolio shrinks, which leads to an increasing arrears ratio, despite the fact that the absolute 
amount of arrears may remain constant or even decrease at a slower rate. The loan channeling 
concept has further implications. Despite the widespread existence of local SHGs in 
Indonesia, project staff, inspired by Grameen practices, insists on establishing new groups of 
an artificial size of 10 members, and on terms and conditions (such as interest rates, loan and 
installment periods) set up by the project and not by the members themselves. Such groups 
lack the autonomy and minimum size to act as local financial intermediaries which mobilize 
their own resources and strive for institutional viability and self-reliance. At the same time, 
group lending is forced upon BRI, which it has detested since its disastrous BIMAS 
experience, despite its positive experience with PHBK. As a result, BRI keeps the groups and 
their members away from its units, which are much closer to the people than the branches. No 
track record is thus established for members as reliable savers and borrowers that may provide 
a basis for the graduation to KUPEDES clients of the units. 
 
The main strength of the project lies exactly in the opposite of all these weaknesses: namely 
in the initiative taken by 9,000 groups to establish a total of 1,800 associations. These are 
informal financial intermediaries of a larger size established by the people themselves outside 
the project’s design. Here people meet weekly, contribute savings, obtain short-term loans 
(mostly for 1-3 months) on terms decided by each association autonomously, and make 
weekly instalments. Some of the associations have grown to a much larger size, the biggest 
with 500 clients. The associations lack legal recognition and an apex structure through which 
technical support may be organized. The P4K monitoring system reports on the number of 
associations, but not on their activities and financial standing. 
 
The project, which operates on its on logic, has failed to take any of the two avenues towards 
microfinance sustainability:  
•  either full integration into the operations of the BRI units, which would require 
submission under the units’ terms including individual lending; in this case, the MoA field 
extension workers might act as assistant loan officers of the staff of the BRI units, which 
on average have one loan officer for every 400 borrowers; 
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appropriate legal status, with an apex structure of their own, or integrated into an existing 
apex structure of other types of SFIs, for guidance, supervision, training, liquidity 
exchange and supplementary bank linkages. In this case, the original concept of small 
solidarity groups, which does not seem to have taken root in the people’s local culture, 
may be abandoned.  
 
 
7.  The experience of the Philippines 
 
7.1  Rural banks and their regulatory environment.  
The Philippines is one of the very first countries to provide a legal form for microfinance 
institutions and deregulate its financial system. In 1952, the Rural Banking Act was passed. 
The rural banks served mainly as a channel for government credit. Deregulation of the 
financial sector started in the early 1980s. However, failing to carry out its land reform to 
provide a basis for a more equitable access to the productive resources of the country, reforms 
remained haphazard. Until the late 1980s, regulation on bank entry and branching was highly 
restrictive. Restrictions comprised the prohibition of new banks; the branching into areas 
categorized as overbranched; increased reserve requirements; and increased capitalization 
requirements. Between 1988 and 1994, these restrictions were gradually removed, leading to 
an increased level of competition and relative improvement in efficiency of the banking 
system. This had positive effects on the expansion of the banking system including rural 
banks. However, deregulation also entailed the withdrawal of much of the cheap and easy 
money the government had provided to the rural banks. As a result, all those rural banks that 
had failed to create their own resource base came under distress, from which some rural banks 
are still trying to recover. Liberalization had overall positive effects on the growth of the 
banking sector, which had shrunk somewhat between 1986 and 1989. During the 
liberalization period, 1989-93, the number of banking offices grew rapidly: from 3,565 to 
4,657, or 29.8%, and continued to grow thereafter. This growth has been stronger among 
commercial banks than among rural banks which suffered from the withdrawal of liquidity,  
with growth rates of 14.6% during 1989-93 and only 12.6% 1993-95. 
 
Table 4:  Offices of bank and non-bank institutions in 1986, 1989, 1993 and 1995  
 
Type of   1986  1989  1993  1995 
financial institution  No.  % ch.
1  No.  % ch.
1  No.  % ch.
1  No.  % ch.
1 
Commercial  banks  1,766 ·  1,765 -0.2  2,377 +34.7  3,047 +28.2 
Rural  banks  1,083 ·  1,043 -3.7  1,195 +14.6  1,346 +12.6 
All  banks  3,614 ·  3,588 -0.7  4,657 +29.8  5,569 +19.6 
Non-bank  FIs  2,283 ·  3,465 +51.8 5,035 +45.3  6,575 +30.6 
All  FIs  5,979 ·  7,135 +19.3 9,809 +37.5  12,266  +25.0 
1 Change in percent    Adopted from: Bangko Sentral Pilipinas, The Philippine Financial System Fact Book 1995 
 
Unfortunately, the central bank of the Philippines, unlike that of Indonesia, is slow in 
processing data on the financial system. There is thus only impressionistic evidence on the 
impact of the crisis. There is a slowdown of economic growth from 5.7% in 1996 and 5.1% in 
1997 to 1.7% during the first quarter of 1998. The Philippines are thus much less affected 
than Indonesia where GDP growth rates dropped from 8.0% in 1996 to 4.7% in 1997 and –
7.9% during the first quarter of 1998.The inflation rate is going up in the Philippines, from a 
low of 5.1% in 1997 to 7.3% during the first quarter of 1998 with estimates of 40% for 1998; 
but not as drastically as in Indonesia where the rate for the first quarter of 1998 is 25.13% and 
  16theestimate for 1998 around 80%.
6 A general economic slowdown is expected; but it is not 
clear whether MFIs might be seriously affected. At least this did not appear to be a serious 
concern of credit NGOs during the Coalition for Microfinance Standards National Summit on 
August 20-21, 1998, nor of rural bankers during their annual meeting on 28 August, 1998, 
which the author both attended. Calls by some rural banker for government liqidity support 
during the crisis were less related to the crisis as such than to the central bank’s response to 
the crisis, namely an increase in minimum capital requirements, which are difficult to comply 
with by weak rural banks and particularly by those in marginal areas. At the same time these 
calls for government support by some were countered by others with a reminder of the ill 
effects of such dependency during the 1980s.  
 
7.2 Microfinance  NGOs 
The microfinance NGOs
7, at their summit on standards, noted that of 600 credit NGOs 
established in the late 1980s only about 300 were left; and of these only about 30 were of any 
significance. A single one so far has availed of the opportunity of registering as a rural bank. 
The coalition is an informal gathering of the 30 major credit NGOs which has formulated 
standards of viability and financial self-reliance (self-sustainability) for credit NGOs
8 and 
carried out a survey on microfinance standards in credit NGOs in the Philippines.
9 There was 
agreement among the members on the usefulness of standards; but they were not willing to 
formalize the coalition into a self-regulatory supervisory body.  
 
7.3 Grameen replicators 
A special issue in the Philippines is Grameen replication, which in this country has found 
strong support. While the overall picture is rather dismal, the two case studies carried out by 
the author in August 1998, one of them recently converted into a rural bank, show that,  
•  the Grameen discipline can be a powerful force in generating near-perfect 
repayment; 
•  that the development of the two replicators studied in detail, one an NGO and one an 
NGO-turned-bank, appears entirely contingent upon internal factors and unimpeded 
by the Asian financial crisis;  
•  that viability can be reached;  
•  but that financial self-sufficiency will remain out of reach as long as donors provide 
loanable funds as a convenient source of easy and cheap money.  
The study is attached in Annex 3. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Source of data on Indonesia and the Philippines: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, August 1998, 
p. 166-7 
7 This is a new term which is now replacing the old term credit NGOs. 
8 Coalition for Microfinance Standards & USAID, The NGO Microfinance Standards toward Outreach and 
Sustainability. Manila, 8/1998. The standards are largely identical with: The SEEP Network/CALMEADOW, 
Financial Ratio Analysis of MFIs. PACT Publications, NYC 1995 
9 Coalition for Microfinance Standards & USAID, Profile of Philippine Microfinance NGOs: A Nationwide 
Survey. 8/1998 
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Grameen replicators in the Philippines: struggling for donor funds... 
Our analysis is based on studies in the Philippines of 27 replicators by ACPC
10 in 1993; six 
replicators  by APDC/UNDP
11 in 1996; three replicators by GTZ
12 in 1997; and two 
supplementary case studies by  Seibel in August 1998. ACPC, a government institution, 
examined its own experience as program executing agency with the 27 Grameen replicators in 
the Philippines, reduced by attrition to 23, as per 6/1993. While highlighting some positive 
aspects, such as a “significant impact on the standard of living of its beneficiaries”, “high 
repayment rates from 94% to 98% (averaging 96.8% in 1993)”
13, and “the poor are capable of 
saving on a regular basis” (p. 85), the facts yielded a rather dismal picture: In a country with a 
diversified MFI infrastructure of, at present, over 800 rural banks, 3000 credit cooperatives 
and 600 credit NGOs, 23 Grameen replicators (including banks, cooperatives and NGOs) had 
a negligible outreach, in 1993, of 4766 individuals (89% of them active borrowers, 184 on 
average), even after an  expansion to 16,432 participants in 12/1995 (95% of them active 
borrowers).  The program was found to be donor-driven; internal resource mobilization was 
minimal; interest rates were inadequate; and costs, shared about equally between government 
and replicators, were exorbitant, amounting to P0.47 per Peso lent and P1.70 per Peso saved, 
plus the costs of institution-building (p. 77). The operational self-sufficiency ratio was 0.24 or 
lower.
14 Noting that “excessive brokering of low-cost funds may discourage savings 
mobilization”, the authors (pp. 85-88) recommended:  
• to offer attractive deposit interest rates and vigorously mobilize savings;  
• to charge loan interest rates that cover at least the transaction costs;  
• to cancel the program guarantee fund;  
• to provide start-up assistance only; and  
• to focus government support on “institution-building, training and management rather 
than on supplying cheap credit.” (p.85-88)  
 
They concluded that “... any attempt... to replicate or expand it (the program) should be 
carried out with great caution”.  
 
                                                 
10 Agricultural Credit Policy Council, An Evaluation of the Grameen Bank Replication Project in the Philippines. 
ACPC, Manila 10/1995. ACPC monitors the Grameen replicators periodically, but does not any formal sense 
supervise them. As NGOs, the Grameen replicators are unsupervised. 
11 I. Getubig, J. Remenyi & B. Quiñones, eds., Creating the Vision: Microfinancing the Poor in Asia-Pacific. 
Asian and Pacific Development Centre, Kuala Lumpur, 1997 
H. D. Seibel, G. M. Llanto, E. Garcia & R. Callanta, Microfinance in the Philippines, Economics and Sociology 
Occasional Paper  No. 2367, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus  
12 Dorothee Rojahn & Karl Osner, Report on the Self Evaluation Workshop of the Replications of the Grameen 
Bank Methodology in Asia. GTZ, Eschborn  5/1998 
13 As of 12/1995, the repayment dropped to 93%. The lowest rate was found among cooperative societies (86%), 
the highest among cooperative banks (98%), with NGOs in-between (98%). 
14 Calculated on the basis of Annex 15 of income and expenses in the ACPC report, plus a loan loss provision of 
3%. The actual ratio might be lower as it is not clear whether financial costs are included in the expenses. The 
ratio is 0.29 for cooperative banks, 0.24 for cooperatives and 0.20 for NGOs. No data are provided to calculate 
the financial self-sufficiency ratio.  
  20... or struggling for viability? 
In 1996, APDC, with UNDP support, carried out an assessment of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) in eleven Asian and Pacific countries, including seven MFIs in the Philippines: one 
cooperative bank and six NGOs. Six of the MFIs in the Philippines use the Grameen 
technology, but not all of them exclusively. As of end-1995, outreach ranged from 1,260 to 
7,000 clients in the seven MFIs, averaging 3,000: a substantial (almost 15-fold) increase over 
the average for mid-1993. 90% of them were women; 94% were classified as poor. Average 
loans outstanding ranged from $30 to $467 among the poor and from $1,500 to $2,600 among 
the non-poor. Savings mobilization continued to be weak, with a savings-to-loans outstanding 
ratio ranging from 0.05 to 0.41 and averaging 0.14.   
 
Table1:  Viability indicators of seven MFIs in the Philippines,1995 
  Cost per average Peso 
of loan outstanding 
Degree of operational 
self-sufficiency in % 
Degree of financial 
self-sufficiency in % 
A 1.30  21  19 
B 1.00  8  7 
C 0.71  51  42 
D 0.48  67  48 
E 0.19  134  118 
F 0.29  113  93 
G 0.34  66  . 
 
 
Another remarkable development had occurred since 1993: a widening of the range between 
good and poor performance. Transaction costs per average Peso of loan outstanding varied  
from 0.19 to 1.30; the operational self-sufficiency ratio varied from 0.08 to 1.34; and the 
financial self-sufficiency ratio (including adjustments for subsidies received and inflation) 
varied from 0.07 to 1.18. The cooperative bank (E in Table 1) performed best of all seven 
institutions. Two of the institutions learned a lesson and applied for a rural bank license: 
CARD (C in Table 1), which since has been transformed into a bank; and TSPI (F in Table 1), 
which failed to meet recently increased equity capital requirements. Two of the institutions (A 
and C in Table 2) are the subject of case studies reported below. 
 
The case of Ahon Sa Hirap Inc. (ASHI): repayment through Grameen discipline 
ASHI, the first Grameen replicator in the Philippines, started in 1989 as a social science 
research project of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños, with a grant of $50,000 
from Cashpor, the regional network of Grameen replicators. In 9/1991, ASHI was registered 
as a non-profit, non-stock corporation, serving 100 beneficiaries in Laguna Province. At the 
same time, it provided Grameen consultancy services to various parishes. In 1992, the founder 
left the Philippines. By 1993, ASHI ran out of resources, depleted by administrative expenses 
and a drop of the repayment rate of its 1329 borrowers to 58%. For every Peso lent, ASHI 
spent P1.23; its operating and financial self-sufficiency ratios stood at 0.16 and 0.14, 
respectively. A crisis of policy and management ensued.  
 
ASHI first decided to fully concentrate on Grameen banking and gave up its consultancy 
services. For reasons of economies of scale, it increased its branch network to five by taking 
over the Grameen activities of parishes it has previously assisted. As ASHI was not the only 
  21Grameen replicator in jeopardy, Cashpor organized a conference in the Philippines in 1994; 
GTZ of Germany and ACT of Belgium got involved; a Moment of Truth was defined; and a 
rehabilitation project was decided for three replicators. For six months, ASHI was practically 
run by a Cashpor consultant, who revamped the organization branch-by-branch and center-by-
center, while the number of borrowers was allowed to drop to 1.226. He retrained all staff and 
rigidly  restored the essentials of Grameen Banking which constitute the self-regulatory 
Grameen social capital, including regular attendance of weekly meetings, punctuality, pledge, 
seating arrangements and - absolute insistence on on-time repayment! In 1995, the headoffice 
moved to a more central location, Quezon City, from where it runs an excellent up-to-day 
MIS. The number of branches grew to seven, with a growth in all-female membership to 
3,521 (3,210 or 91% of them borrowers) in 1996; 4,698 (4,447 or 93% borrowers) in 1997 
and 5,955 (5,717 or 96% borrowers) in 7/1998.  
 
As a result of the restored Grameen discipline, the repayment rate soared from 64.4% in 1994 
to 99.0% in 1995, hovering around 97-98% thereafter (1996: 96.6%; 1997: 97.9%; 7/1998: 
97.9%). Transaction costs were drastically lowered: from P1.23 per Peso lent in 1993 to P0.25 
in 1997. Accordingly, the operational self-sufficiency ratio steadily increased from 0.16 in 
1993 to 0.58 in 1997, paralleled by an increase in the financial self-sufficiency ratio from 0.14 
to 0.54 – still far from satisfactory, but on a promising course. With 60% of its loanable funds 
from grants and soft loans, financial self-sufficiency is not in sight.  
 
Table 2    ASHI performance data, 1993-7/1998 
Year  No. of  
borrowers 
Borrowers 









1993 1329  87  58.0  1.23  0.16  0.14 
1994 1226  120  64.9  0.91  0.19  0.15 
1995 2437  140  99.0  0.77  0.29  0.22 
1996 3210  153  96.6  0.52  0.42  0.41 
1997 4447  156  97.9  0.25  0.57  0.54 
7/98  5717          ·  97.9      ·  ·  · 
Source: ASHI Annual Report 1997; Monthly Statement, 7/1998 
 
ASHI, though barred by law from mobilizing savings, is now trying to strengthen its deposit 
base. In addition to the usual compulsory savings and loan deductions, it has introduced a 
two-year children’s savings scheme, with weekly deposits of P50 or P100 at 4% interest p.a.
15 
Loans of 6-12 months start with P2,000 ($46 by the 8/1998 exchange rate) and increase up to 
P10,000 in the fifth cycle. To increase its profitability, ASHI has added loans ranging from 
P15,000 to P50,000 ($345-$1150); and it is increasing its interest rate from 20% flat (approx. 
37% effective) to 25% flat (approx. 46% effective) p.a.
16 Another new product is a one-month 
loan of P3-5000 with weekly instalments, at a flat interest rate of 6%. With viability and 
sustainability its future goal,  ASHI considers to convert the compulsory 5% capital build-up 
deduction from all loans into shares and, within five years, transform the NGO into a 
cooperative bank owned by ASHI members and staff.
17 
                                                 
15 At an inflation rate of 7.4%, this is equivalent to negative real returns of 3.4% 
16 For the larger loans, ASHI carries out creditworthiness examinations. At the time of the field visit, Mrs. D., 
after having received and repaid a number of loans from ASHI totaling P87,000, had submitted a new 
application for a livestock loan of P50,000, for which ASHI calculated a profit rate or 158%. 
17 Special microfinance training courses, including the preparation of custom-made training materials and 
operational manuals, may be arranged by ASHI through INSOL (ahon@i-manila.com.ph). 
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The case of CARD: a viable Grameen Rural Bank in the Philippines 
Inspired by the onset of a new era after the downfall of the Marcos regime, the Center for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) was one of numerous new NGOs established in 
1986 and thereafter. With two grants of P150,000 each,  CARD, as of 1/1988, organized the 
poor in mixed groups of 15-45 members, registered them as associations (including some 
spouses to reach the required minimum number of 21 members) and channeled short-term 
loans (3-6 months) of P1,000 to each member. With negotiable repayment schedules, this 
turned out to be a false start. After eight months, only the two groups which had opted for 
monthly instalments had repaid their loan. The remaining five, with lump sum repayment 
upon maturity, defaulted. The overall repayment rate during that year was 68%. Under donor 
pressure, CARD was either to close or revamp its operations.  
 
In late 1988, the president of CARD visited the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Deeply 
impressed by the ability of the poor to engage in income-generating activities and repay their 
loans on time, he decided, upon his return, to adopt the Grameen approach, organizing poor 
women in groups of 5 and centers of 30. This, however, met with considerable opposition. 
The complex Grameen discipline, including weekly meetings and weekly instalments,  were 
greatly disliked, particularly by the men. Four of the associations left the project; 89 poor 
women agreed to participate in a pilot test, from January to December 1989. Credit discipline, 
which is one of the most outstanding achievements of the Grameen approach, produced 
repayment rates of 98.0%-100.0% between 1994 and 6/1998 (end-of-year figures; annual 
averages 96.9-99.7%). This impressed BSP, the central bank, so much that it consented to 
fully non-collateralized lending when CARD later established itself as a rural bank 
 
 But active membership grew only slowly: to 307 in 1990, 468 in 1991, 949 in 1992 and 
1,711 in 1993. 1990-96 were years of experimentation to modify the Grameen technology. 
CARD developed its own training system and operations manual; substituted 6-months first-
loans for one-year loans; required a minimum self-financing ratio of 25% from repeat 
borrowers; introduced a mutual life and accident insurance fund; replaced group funds by 
center funds; offered multipurpose loans for prime borrowers; added voluntary withdrawable 
savings (ignoring the law which bars NGOs from deposit taking); and, finally, provided a 
staff incentive scheme. Active membership soared from 1,711 in 1993 to 6,844 in 1996. By 
1996, nonwithdrawable compulsory savings stood at P12m, voluntary savings at P1m. 
Operational self-sufficiency, which had declined from 0.31 in 1993 to 0.25 in 1994, went up 
to 0.46 in 1996 and 0.77 in 1996. 
 
In May 1996, CARD submitted its application to establish a rural bank, which was approved 
in December. This means that CARD Bank now falls under the regulation and supervision of 
the central Bank, which, according to our hypothesis mobilizes an entirely new quality of 
CARD’s social capital. 
 
After having deposited P5m as paid-up capital with Landbank, CARD Rural Bank (RB) 
formally opened on 1 September 1997. There are now two institutions: CARD RB for 
financial intermediation, with 5 branches, and CARD NGO for group formation and guidance 
including financial intermediation in areas not covered by a CARD RB branch, with 16 
branches. Due to legal restrictions, CARD NGO owns only 25% of CARD RB; the rest is 
owned by five board members and staff, who have entered into a trust agreement with the 
NGO.  
 
  23Transformation into a bank appears to have greatly facilitated the growth of group 
membership, which soared to 10,868 in 1997 and 16,589 as of July 1998. During July 1998 
alone, the Bank acquired 1,451 new clients.  CARD RB has ambitious goals: 20,000 active 
members by end-1998, 50,000 by 2000 and 150,000 by 2002. 
 
The Bank offers passbook savings at 5% and fixed deposits, ranging from a minimum of 
P10,000 for one month at 7% interest to P500,000 for 12 months at 15%: all above the usual 
commercial bank rates. As of July 1998, the savings deposit balance was P14m. There are 
five loan products, all with weekly instalments: regular loans increasing from a first loan of 
P2,000 to a fourth loan of P10,000; asset acquisition loans up to P50,000; housing loans up to 
P20,000; short-term multipurpose loans up P5,000; and prime-borrower loans up to P100,000. 
Maturities range from 12-75 weeks; but most are 50 weeks. Interest rates are 20% flat, plus an 
upfront service fee of 4%; effective annual interest rates are 45.6%-53.8%.  
 
Table 3:     CARD  performance data, 1988-7/1998 












1988 150  68.0         
1989 89           
1990 307           
1991 468        0.31   
1992 949        0.25   
1993 1,711        0.46   
1994  3,547  98.0          0.77   
1995 4,240  98.8  0.17  .69  0.46  0.38 
1996 6,844  99.2  0.12  .46  0.77  0.52 
1997 10,868  100.0  0.00  .33  1.22  0.70 
7/98 16,589  99.9  0.09    1.31   
Source: Dolores M. Torres, Managing Delinquency and Quality Portfolio, 8/1998; Monthly 
Statement,  7/1998 
 
In 7/1998, the loan portfolio of CARD Rural Bank amounted to P32m, that of CARD NGO to 
P38m. Each of the two entities recently obtained a loan of P15m from the People’s Credit and 
Finance Corporation, PCFC , which is funded by ADB and IFAD, at 12% interest p.a. and a 
1% annual service fee on the outstanding balance.  
 
Transformation into a rural bank, which included a preparatory phase in 1996-97,  seems to 
have brought CARD closer to its desired sustainability goals: the cost efficiency ratio (cost 
per Peso lent) improved from 0.69 in 1995 to 0.33 in 1997; the operational self-sufficiency 
ratio climbed from 0.46 in 1995 to 0.77 in 1996, 1.22 in 1997 and 1.31 in 7/1998 (with 234 
borrowers per field staff); financial self-sufficiency (adjusted for subsidies and inflation) grew 
from 38% in 1995 to 52% in 1996 and 70% in 1997. CARD branch viability (operational 
self-sufficiency ratio of at least 1.0) increased rapidly: from none out of eight branches in 
1995 to four out of ten in 1996 and eight out of 13 in 1997. 
 
Card Rural Bank has proven that outreach to the poor and operational viability are not only 
compatible: they are mutually reinforcing.
18 As to financial self-reliance and full financial 
self-sufficiency, the Bank has made great progress in recent years. However, continued access 
                                                 
18 This is also confirmed by Rojahn & Osner (p. 12) who observed that Grameen replicators which are low in 
operational viability are also low in outreach, while replicators high in viability are also high in outreach. 
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Is the Grameen approach a type of social capital that can be exported world-wide, with a 
success similar to that of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh? Does the Grameen approach 
provide an optimal solution to the problem of how to provide financial services to the poor? 
We have looked at two criteria, outreach and institutional viability (ignoring a third, namely 
impact). In the Philippines, the outreach of Grameen replicators has been negligible compared 
to the totality of financial services provided by other microfinance institutions. All 
replications are donor-driven. Donor-dependency has undermined their viability. Only few of 
the institutions are operationally self-sufficient, covering their costs from their income. In 
some cases, even effective annual interest rates around 50% (or real rates, adjusted for 
inflation, around 40%) were not sufficient to cover the costs of the Grameen technology. But 
all of the institutions examined, which are of course only those who have survived, have 
progressed in this respect and might, eventually, be operationally fully viable.  
 
Sustainability, however, is not in sight in any of the replicating institutions (except where 
Grameen replication is a side activity). None even remotely approaches an adequate level of 
internal resource mobilization; nor does anyone earn enough revenues to cover all operating, 
financial and loan loss expenses and the value of adjustments for subsidies and inflation. The 
biggest obstacle in the development of the Grameen replicators has been donor support: a 
powerful incentive to substitute external resources for local savings.
20 Only domestic savings 
have a chance to grow dynamically; government and donor dole-outs do not. It seems 
speculative at this point to predict if financial self-sufficiency might ever be reached by any of 
the institutions. However, those who adhere to the pure and unadjusted Grameen technology 
and insist on banking with the poor only are unlikely to withstand the growing competition of 
other MFIs  in the long run. 
 
Our question is: do the Grameen replicators reach the poor, and are they sustainable? 
According to the limited evidence presented in this paper, the answer is: They are not 
sustainable; and therefore, they do not reach the poor in sufficient numbers. It appears that the 
Grameen approach is no magic formula, and no best practice or unique and optimal solution 
that may be applied around the world to alleviate poverty. I am not aware that any such 
optimal solution or best practice ever existed, or may ever be found. However, there may be 
sound practices, which work for a certain time under certain conditions and may compete 
with other sound practices.  
 
There are a number of sound practices which may explain some of the success of some of the 
replicators. It appears that successful replicators share a least the following three sound 
practices, constituting perhaps the hard core social capital of the original Grameen 
approach: 
 
                                                 
19 CARD (card@msc.net.ph)  is prepared to share its experience. Since 1996, it has trained 2,500 people in 
courses of one to two weeks length. Training is conducted in English, at P500 ($11.50) per day.  
20 This conclusion is shared by the authors of a GTZ (Bieding et al. 1998:79) study of the financial sector in the 
Philippines, who „do not recommend promoting Grameen Bank replicators at the institutional level because the 
model is not currently implemented in a sustainable manner in the Philippines. This is seen in the context of “the 
need to revise the system of incentives created by national and international donors. These have accorded   
precedence to disbursing short-term credit to target groups over the institutional and financial sustainability of 
the programs and institutions.” 
  25• high moral commitment of leaders based on values enforced through training 
• peer selection and peer enforcement, precluding adverse selection and moral hazard 
credit discipline, including weekly instalments; rigid insistence on timely 
repayment; and repeat loans of growing sizes contingent upon repayment 
performance. 
 
It further appears that the most promising replicators are the innovators who have 
experimented with modifications to the classical replication model, constituting additional 
core social capital dimensions outside of Bangladesh, among them in particular: 
 
• local bank status (rather than NGO or national bank status) 
• deposit mobilization through differentiated products with attractive interest rates 
• differentiated loan and insurance products which cover all costs and risks  
• client differentiation through larger-size loan and deposit products for non-poor 
 members. 
 
Grameen-type MFIs in the Philippines are only successful to the extent they have 
implemented these criteria – and unsuccessful to the extent they have failed to do so. We may 
tentatively consider the seven points listed above as the essence of the social capital of 
Grameen-type institutions in the Philippines and perhaps worldwide. Depending on the 
policy environment, the legal framework, the microfinance infrastructure, and particular 
circumstances (such as natural disasters, which may preclude timely repayment), most of 
these practices may be recommended for emulation, both  by Grameen and non-Grameen 
MFIs, though not for mechanical replication. There is no reason why a Grameen-type MFI, 
which registers as a bank, mobilizes its own resources through differentiated savings 
products, offers differentiated loan and insurance products which cover all costs and risks, and 
provides larger-size loan and deposit products to its non-poor members, should not become 
viable and financially self-sufficient and offer sustainable financial services to an ever-
growing number of poor, and eventually non-poor, clients. However, whether it will do all 
this, depends on the will of its board and management. There is no regulatory authority 
supervising and enforcing these requirements of sound Grameen banking, which is perhaps its 
greatest weakness. 
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